Products "R" Features

As a freshly minted Associate at a venture capital firm in early 2000's, I recall that one of my criteria for evaluating investment opportunities was figuring out (with analytic precision, of course) whether a particular startup was really a "product" or a "feature"... Turns out that was a totally futile (if not counterproductive) exercise!

So many of today's über-successful startups in fact are nothing more than features. Google started out as a feature inside a portal (Yahoo) and who knows, may end up being a feature inside a social network or mobile device 5 or 10 years from now. And look at all these neat features on your smart phone called Apps! Wouldn't you have loved to invest in some of the popular ones, like Angry Birds?

I think the traditional problem with investing in "feature" companies is the concern that a "product" company in that industry, with its seemingly infinite resources, can one day easily roll out that feature and crush that "feature" company. Sort of like how Apple crushed (wink, wink, nudge, nudge) Siri to the tune of over $200 million and Google crushed YouTube for $1.7 billion...

Suffice it to say, lots of great VC investments can be made in things that may be considered mere features today, but will end up being far more revolutionary and game-changing than many products in the market.  In the long run, we will all be dead and all products become features anyway!

Are you "Michael Jordan playing Baseball"?

Much more often than I like to see, I come across entrepreneurs who remind me of Jordan retiring from basketball to try his hand at baseball in 1994 (speculations abound as to why, but nonetheless he had the good sense to pivot back to basketball just after one miserable baseball season).

These days, with the consumer Internet momentum in full swing, I see first-time and repeat entrepreneurs from many fields (including law, life sciences, and enterprise software) pitching their Powerpoints and raising money for their first consumer Internet startup. And although I am usually the optimist and last guy to discourage anyone from a path of entrepreneurship, I can't help but be quite disappointed by this crop of entrepreneurs.

My disappointment stems primarily from the fact that in this new gold rush, Silicon Valley's greatest asset (intellectual capital) is wasted on futile reinventions of the consumer Internet wheel. To the uninitiated, building this shiny "wheel" may seem as simple as outsourcing a website and hooking it up with a set of "spokes" consisting of a database, Google Analytics, and a Facebook Connect integration to boot. But those who have been through the ordeal before, know better.

For starters, you need an understanding and appreciation of what it means to deliver a virtual consumer user experience that delights and transforms casual visitors to engaged users who would return and promote your services via repeated interactions. You need an appreciation of the delicate interplay between your technology platform and analytics, traffic and rapid iteration (aka A/B testing). And you need to understand how critical time is to everything you do. Which means, you cannot afford to start from ground zero and therefore, need to be able to recruit expert UI & UX designers, analysts, and developers that can deliver and improve what your users need faster than competition.

Is that impossible? Of course not, but as a first-time consumer Internet entrepreneur, your chances are pretty slim unless you bring in a co-founder that has done this in the past. Plus, you will need to recruit mentors, advisors and Board members that can shed light for you on the areas that you are lacking.

In summary, my advice to first-time entrepreneurs in consumer Internet (as well as any other field) is from the onset to

(1) talk to industry experts to map out the areas of competence that you need in-house to be successful,
(2) take an honest look at the founding team to assess which areas of competence you are lacking, and
(3) recruit co-founders/advisors/mentors/board members to fill in those holes.

Although entrepreneurship is a noble endeavor, doing it without adequate preparation is socially wasteful and irresponsible.

Manufacturing Entrepreneurs

I think every politician/economist in the world has by now accepted the fact that entrepreneurship is vital to long-term economic growth and prosperity. Much less understood, however, is how one would best go about creating more entrepreneurs in the society.

Do you create more entrepreneurs by copying "Silicon Valley" (whatever that means)? Do you do so by pouring more money into science education and R&D? Or by giving more tax incentives for engaging in entrepreneurial activities? Or is a liberal-arts education the missing ingredient, as Vivek Wadhwa recently suggested in The New York Times and TechCrunch?

As an entrepeneur with a liberal arts background (Philosophy, Economics, and Law), I do firmly believe that having had some exposure to the liberal arts is of great value in leading a well-rounded and grounded life. However, when it comes to entrepreneurship, I am not sure how much credit I can justifiably give to my liberal arts training.  As a matter of fact, I think the role of financial incentives, sciences as well as the liberal arts in creating more entrepreneurs in a society is quite limited at best. In other words, they may be considered necessary conditions for more entrepreneurship, but by no means sufficient. This is supported by existence of plenty of countries/states/regions/universities in the world that produce excellent scientific and liberal arts scholars and provide lots of tax incentives for entrepreneurial activities (such as in Canada), but those efforts do not produce the desired entrepreneurial activity in the target population who opt for more traditional career paths.

Why? Because the emphasis on  individual incentives and particular college degrees misses the essence of entrepreneurship, which is fundamentally a social activity and therefore mostly influenced by the prevailing culture. Some cultures (be it within a society, a company or a single family) kill entrepreneurship desires while others nurture and grow it.  In my experience, entrepreneurship only thrives in a culture that is forgiving towards those who fail at taking entrepreneurial risk.

Wherever I have seen strong cultural punishments (e.g., guilt, shame, etc.) associated with failed entrepreneurial endeavors (as in Canada, Germany and so many other societies), entrepreneurship has been stifled. Conversely, the culture in Silicon Valley intrinsically celebrates and values taking entrepreneurial risks. Having had near-hits with one's past ventures, in the Valley, is something to be proud of (even brag about) rather than hide. Behind most successful Valley executives and entrepreneurs is usually a trail of failed prior attempts. Counter-intuitively to outsiders, past misses make an entrepreneur even more "fundable", as those experiences are deemed invaluable to VC's and Angels alike.

Regardless of whether the Valley mindset was created by amazing foresight or sheer historic accident, it is apparently exactly what our mammalian brains need to take on risk. According to a recent psychology experiment recounted by Jonah Lehrer on his blog, our brains' pleasure centers hardly distinguish between almost winning and actually winning, which explains why so many people flock to Vegas and actually enjoy throwing hard-earned cash at one-sided gambles. He goes on to provide an evolutionary explanation:

Why would the mammalian brain be designed this way? One answer is that we didn’t evolve for Vegas. Rather, near misses help us stay motivated when engaged in activities that require actual skill, and not dumb luck. Let’s say we’re learning to play basketball. At first, our shots are going to be all over the place, a seemingly random distribution of bricks and airballs. And yet, as we slowly get better, those shots will get closer to the rim. A few might even go in, which is pretty thrilling. The purpose of near misses, then, is to keep us motivated while we slowly improve our form. If we only got excited by makes, we’d quickly give up, which is why the brain also needs a mechanism to register progress.

Now imagine that you lived in a society where everytime someone missed the basket during training or in a game, they were boo'ed off the court or worse yet, threatened that they could never play basketball again. How many star basketball players would that society produce?

Just like in professional sports, entrepreneurship requires "actual skill, and not dumb luck." If the culture discourages risk taking entrepreneurial endeavors by punishing those who fail at it, then you start messing with those brain centers responsible for motivating people to become entrepreneurs in the first place. In which case, no amount of rewards, tax incentives, scientific or liberal arts education can motivate people to get in the game and start practicing.

What's So Wrong with Arrogance?

I have always had a negative gut reaction to arrogant/overconfident people. In popular culture, however, arrogance is played up as a cornerstone of success and downright entrepreneurial chutzpah, exemplified by icons such as Zuck in The Social Network, Gordon Gekko in Wall Street or Donald Trump in the avalanche of The Apprentice "reality" shows.

But I felt vindicated when in the last issue of Harvard Business Review I encountered a very interesting research entitled "Experts Are More Persuasive When They Are Less Certain" by Associate Professor Zakary Tormala of Stanford GSB. According to this research which tallied ratings of a fictitious restaurant based on a variety of professional and amateur reviews, my gut reaction to arrogance has been spot on with majority of folks:

[We] asked subjects what they’d pay for a meal at our fictitious restaurant, Bianco’s. People who’d read the tentative professional review were willing to pay 56% more than people who’d read the highly certain professional review. But uncertainty had almost the exact opposite effect with amateur opinions. People who’d read a confident amateur review were willing to pay 54% more for a meal than those who’d read an uncertain amateur review.

Professor Tormala attributes this phenomenon to "expectancy violations":

People expect experts to be confident. Violations of that expectation surprise them. We see that in our data. Subjects reported being more surprised by the uncertain experts and the confident amateurs. A surprise draws you in and makes you pay more attention. It gives the review more impact.

I also think there is another phenomenon at play, which for a lack of a better word I call "Car Salesman Phobia". On a deep philosophic level, we all suspect that there is really no certainty in life. So whenever someone starts to come across too strong about anything, our intuitive alarm bells go off that this person may either have an ulterior motive (like a car salesman) or be so amazed by themselves that they are not checking their own blind spots. Those alarm bells are somewhat muffled when the expert starts admitting that there is room for doubt and further research.

So, you may ask, why is it that when amateurs show confidence we tend to trust them more? This, I believe, is due to the fact we start at such a low trust level with amateurs that their admission of certitude (or anything else other than total ignorance) is a relative improvement.

In conclusion, next time you are pitching your company to an investor or new hire, think about whether or not the person you are talking to would consider you an "amateur" or "expert" and then act with respective dose of humility, 

What do you think?

How to Avoid VC Nightmares

Apropos for Halloween night, I like to dedicate this post to some of the investor horror stories that circulate around the entrepreneurial community in Silicon Valley in hushed whispers. Without naming names, I have been privy to the gory details of a few such stories (Oh, the Horror!), which typically fall into 3 categories:

(A) Our VC forced us to sell too early and we left all of the upside on the table
(B) Our VC stopped us from selling when we should have, and now I have nothing to show for it
(C) Our VC drove me out of my company/business at the worst possible time, leading to its eventual demise

Needless to say, this is not an exhaustive list and textbooks, in multiple volumes, can be dedicated to collecting all the various gripes entrepreneurs have against their investors. Typically, in my experience, the complaints are leveled against professional venture capitalists (VCs) rather than the angel investor individuals or groups, although the emergence of institutional Super Angels may change things in the future. And so, I will continue the rest of this post by focusing on VCs and how you may avoid becoming another cautionary tale in your dealings with them.

Is the "Horror" real?

In my last post, I described how bad investors can kill your company. That horror is definitely real. Anecdotally, the depth and magnitude of grievances against VCs can only compete with one other group of professionals: LAWYERS! With the exception that there aren't as many VC jokes out in circulation because many of us still hope to raise some money from the VCs and don't want those jokes to be digitally traced back to us. (Although, as a former lawyer and VC, I do find the negativity with both professions to be somewhat... hyped).

And then sometimes the entrepreneurs are so deeply hurt (physically, psychologically and/or financially) that they throw caution to the wind and decide to drop a nuclear bomb on their bridge to the VC riches by going after them in the court of law (see, e.g., Epinions founders suing Benchmark and August Capital) or in the court of public opinion (see, e.g., ArsDigita co-founders' revelations). There is even a growing Quora thread on this topic.


In summary, this is spooky stuff indeed!

Antidote: Investor due diligence

Although it is hard to have any real guarantees, should you find yourself in need of VC money, doing your homework on your investors can lessen your risk and improve your chances of picking the right investors.

First thing to remember is that not all VC's are created equal. There are worlds of difference between VC firms and even between partners in the same firm. So, start your preliminary diligence well before you even send out your Executive Summary. And make sure to really dig in before you go too far down the path of negotiating a term sheet, as it becomes exponentially harder (if not impossible due to cognitive dissonance) to switch investors once you have a signed term sheet in place.


Things to investigate during diligence

Although it seems like a daunting task that would necessitate hiring an elite PI agency with former CIA/IRS credentials, most of the important stuff you would be looking for is already out there for you to see.

Reference Checks. Talk to former founders/executives that the VC firm (and more importantly, the partner on your deal) has invested in. Make sure to talk to companies where things did not go super smoothly (names of which you will most likely have to dig out on your own). Try to get a feel for how it is to work with this firm/partner during good times and hard times. Their behavior during hard times is especially important as I had mentioned before.

Portoflio Size and Composition. You need know how many other portfolio companies does the VC firm/partner care about, and whether they actually have the bandwidth to do the things you expect them to do. Also, you need to get a feel whether you fall within the sweet spot of the kind of companies this firm does well with, or you are one of the outliers. Then check against your gut to see how you feel about that. Also, note that typically larger firms with larger porfolio sizes tend to push their investments towards higher exit multiples rather than allow for earlier liquidity.

Porfolio Integrity. This is something that is often ignored. Does this firm have a history of investing in competitive companies in the same field? Some VCs actually do that. You need to know the truth, because as a portfolio company, you cannot stop your VCs from investing in your competitor if they chose to do so.

Number/Amount of Investments. Find out, over the lifetime of the current fund, how many investments the firm/partner is expected to make, and how far they are currently from meeting that quota and deploying the cash invested in them. This matters, because it will determine the amount of attention and care your startup is likely to get over the next few years. Also, if the firm is towards the end of the lifetime on their fund they will be more likely to look for faster liquidity events and will be very distracted during their upcoming fundraising cycle.

Available Funds. You need to have a realistic picture as to how much more cash this investor is likely to deploy into your company, which is a function of how much on average they spend on each portfolio company and whether they have enough cash left in the fund to satisfy that obligation given existing and projected investments.

History of Lawsuits/Disputes. You need to know whether the firm/partner on your deal is or has been involved in lawsuits. Again, those lawsuits can tell you a lot about skeletons in the closet, as well as the distractions that will likely take the attention of the firm away from you.

Risk Profile. Another thing to get a sense for is whether this firm/partner has the wherewithal to take some serious risks and take a market position (the way such firms like Kleiner Perkins or Sequoia Capital do), or whether they like to play it safe and will abandon you/your vision after hitting a rough patch.

Most of the above information is readily obtainable. It does take some investment of time, but can you afford not to spend the time on them?

Happy Halloween!